is poorly understood, although a number of reasonable hypotheses have been advanced. The nve hypotheses listed below, although not directly tested in the present research, must be regarded as promising. 2 With the exception of the dissonance hypothesis, all of these derive from the dis cussion of role-plaYing effectiveness given by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953, Chapter 7) ; references given in parentheses indicate only more recent treatments.
1. Selective learning. Playing the role of an advocate of a given posi tion may facilitate opinion change by prompting selective attention to or retention of arguments supporting that position (Greenwald and Albert, 1968; Watts, 1967) .
2. Biased scanning. When the role playing assignment is accepted, the subject may become temporarily motivated to seek arguments that sup port his assigned position (Elms and Janis, 1965; Janis and Gihnore, 1965) .
3. Self as source. Arguments perceived as self-originated may be more readily accepted than ones perceived as externally originated (Green wald, 1968; Greenwald and Albert, 1968; King and Janis, 1956) .
4. Hand-tailoring. An individual may be able to construct a com munication that is uniquely effective for his own belief structure.
5. Dissonance. Acceptance of the role-played position may be in the service of reducing dissonance aroused by counterattitudinal performance (Festinger, 1957) or by the effort of performing the role playing task (Watts, 1967; Zimbardo, 1965) .
Cognitive Response Analysis
Without taking a position with regard to the above hypotheses, the present research tested an interpretation of role-playing effectiveness derived from the general hypothesis (Greenwald, 1968) that persuasion effects are mediated by the rehearsal and learning of attitude-relevant cognitive responses elicited in the persuasion situation. According to this analysis, the "role-playing effect" would be expected if agreement to advocate a view opposing one's own entailed adopting a disposition to react cognitively in a fashion more than usually favorable to information supporting that opposing position.
To test this interpretation, the experiments reported here started by establishing expectations in subjects that they would be obliged to write essays supporting a given arbitrarily seleCted side on the issue of general (liberal arts) versus specialized (career preparatory) undergraduate edu 377 BOLE PLAYING AND OPINION ORANGE cation. Before being allowed to carry through these assignments, subjects were given the task of judging the validity of a standard set of arguments supporting each position. H the cognitive response analysis is correct, then subjects should judge arguments supporting a given position as having roore validity if assigned to advocate that position than if asked to support the reverse position. In advance of considering specific proce· dures and results, it should be observed that findings consistent with the present hypothesis should not be interpreted as indicating that alterna tive hypotheses (listed above) are in error. The question of compatibility of the cognitive response analysis with the other hypotheses will be c0n sidered after the presentation of result..,
PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT

Subjects and Procedure
Sixty..six undergraduate students in the introductory psychology course at Ohio State University were recruited, in partial fulfillment of their course requirements, for an "'expository writing" study. The study was conducted in a single group session with experimental materials presented in a 6-page booklet.
The first page of the booklet introduced the study by defining the alternative points of view on general and specialized undergraduate education and !fSking sub· jects to :indicate "which of these positions you think has more merit." Subjects indi cated their own initial position by checking either "general undergraduate education" or "specialized undergraduate education." On page 2, expository writing ability was defined as "the ability to present, forcefully, persuasively, and originally, a position on one side or another of an issue." Subjects were then arbitrarily assigned to advocate only one side of the general-specialized education issue by reading the sentence, You have been assigned, arbitrarily, to write in support of a ---college education. [The blank was filled, in handwriting, with either the word "generaf' or "specialized."] Since there are many valid arguments to be made on both sides of this issue, we feel that no one will be disappointed by this arbitrary assignment.
Subjects then read three questions that they were to answer with short essays supporting their assigned position, but were advised that they would not answer these questions immediately. These questions were intended to reinforce the assigned posi tion manipulation without containing persuasive content. For example, one of the questions was:
How does a (specialized, general) [one or the other of the words in parentheses was crossed out, as appropriate] college education facilitate the student's successful pla.cem.ent in a future career?
Page 3 was headed "Expm,itory Writing-Preparatory Materials." On this page, subjects were instructed that a short period was to be spent examining the topic prior to writing their essays. During this period they were to indicate their reactions to each of l2 statements printed on pages 4 aJlcl5, The instructions oontirmed; Following each statement on the next two pages, three blank lines were provided for subjects to indicate their reactions. Half of the statements were one-sentence arguments supporting general education, e.g.:
The student who has the opportunity to attend a variety of courses in college is in a better position to decide which area is best suited to his needs and abilities.
The remaining statements were one-sentence arguments supporting specialized education, e.g.:
Without specialization starting early in college education it will be impossible to train the average student to fit into the highly specialized positions of the future American economy.
Subjects were allowed 15 minutes for reading and reacting to the 12 statements, following which they responded (page 6) to II 4·item Likert-type opinion measure on the generaJ-specialized education issue. Subjects were then given an explanation of the hypotheses underlying the experiment, were cautioned to regard the experimental procedures and hypotheses as confidential, and were dismissed.
Results and Discussion
For each statement, subjects' reactions were classified as indicating that they regarded the statement as vaJid ( +1), invalid (-1), or neither (0). The sum of these scores for the six statements supporting general education was then subtracted from that for the six supporting specialized education, resulting in a cognitive reaction index with a potential range from -12 to +12 (observed range: -11 to +12). These judgments were made by two judges, whose index scores diHered by more than. tvvo points on the 25-point scale for only six of the 66 subjects. The means for this index for one of the judges are given in Table I together with final opinion data with subjects classified in tenns of their initial and assigned positions.
Analyses of variance were conducted on the data for the tvvo measures given in Table I . For the index of reactions to the 12 statements, strong main effects of both initial position (F = 12.00, 1 and 62 df, p < .001), and assigned position (F = 37.02, 1 and 62 df, p < .001) were obtained, with no interaction (F < 1). Note.-Celi 11.'8 are given in parentheses in the upper part of the table. The potential range of the cognitive reaction index was -12 to +12 while that for the opinion measure was 0-20. In both cases, the higher end of the scale represents favorability to specialized undergraduate education. The withm.cells standard deviation estimates were 5,18 for the reaction index and 3.73 for the opinion measure.
that subjects' reactions to controversial statcments tended to be consistent with their initial opinions, was expected (d. Greenwald, 1968) , while the effect of assigned position was exactly that suggested by the cognitive response analysis-information supporting a given position was evaluated more favorably when the position was thc assigned one than when it was not.
For the final opinion measure, a strong and expected main effect of initial position was found (F = 52.01, 1 and 62 df, p < .001) and a significant, but weaker, main effect of assigned position was also obtained ( F 4.44, 1 and 62 df, p < ,05); again there was no interaction effect (F < 1). The main effect of assigned position indicated opinion change effects of the role playing assignment without actual role playing.
MAIN EXPERIMENT
In considering possible alternative interpretations of the large main effect of assigned position on reactions to the controversial statements, the author speculated that two possibly complicating factors prevented a firm conclusion supporting the cognitive response interpretation. First, it might be that the instructions to consider the statements' "relevance to your expository writing task» led subjects to react to each statement in 380 ANTHONy C. GBEENW ALl> terms of whether or not it might be usable in their essays; this would naturally lead to a tendency to accept more statements supporting the assigned position, but would not necessarily reflect a corresponding difference in evaluative cognitive responses to the two sets of statements. Second, the same aspect of the instructions might establish demand char acteristics in the sense of maldng the purpose of the "preparatory" task relatively transparent; the subjects might have been able to detect the author's interest in the relation between assigned position and reactions to the controversial statements. In recognition of these possible restrictions on interpretation of the preliminary experiment's findings, the preparatory task and its instructions were redesigned so as to reduce their trans parency while also decreasing the apparent relevance of the statement judging task to the anticipated essay writing task.
Subjects and Procedure
Fifty additional subjects were recruited from the same population used for the preliminary experiment. This study was also conducted in a single session, USing a 6-page booklet that differed from that for the preliminary experiment in three of its pages. Page 1 (introduction of the general-specialized education issue and classifica tion of initial opinion), page 2 (arbitrary assignment to one of the two positions), and page 6 (final opinion measure) were identical to those previously used. The three new pages were those for the "preparatory" task of judging the validity of statements pertinent to the experimental issue.
The instructions for the statement validity-judgment task (page 3) were modified so that the essential portion read:
Your task for these statements will be to evaluate each, to the best of your ability, in tenus of its objective merits, regardless of whether it supports your assigned position or not. Try to judge each statement as a valid or invalid state ment about the issue in question. A valid statement is one that should be taken into account in forming an intelligent opinion on this topic, while an invalid statement is one that needn't be given detailed consideration.
(While it was not expected that these instructions would eliminate demand characteristics from the experiment, it did seem that they would reshape any existing demand characteristics in the direction of promoting objective judgment, thus pos sibly attenuating rather than enhancing the predicted effects.)
The number of statements to be judged was reduced from 12 to 10 by eliminating two statements, one supporting each side, that also appeared as items in the final opinion measure. Last, the format for judging the statements' validity was modified so as to allow fully objective scoring. Instead of writing only an overall reaction to each statement, subjects were asked to indicate for each statement (a) which position, general or specialized education, they thought it supported, (b) whether they judged the statement to be valid or invalid, and (c) the reason for their validity judgment.
Fifteen minutes were allowed for these judgments, followed by the final opinion JIleasure, which concluded the experiment.
Results
Only subjects' judgments as to which side each statement supported and whether each statement was valid or invalid were used for scoring their reactions to the statements. A reaction was considered to' favor specialized education (+1) if the subject either felt that the statement supported specialized education and was valid or supported general education and was invalid; correspondingly a reaction was considered to support general education (-1) fDr items judged to support general education and to be valid or to support specialized education while being judged invalid. With few exceptions, subjects identified all 10 statements as supporting the intended viewpO'ints; in the case O'f these exceptions, the subject's actual judgment as to side supported was used as the basis for scoring. A cognitive reaction index based on the sum of scores for the judgments of the 10 statements had a potential range of -10 to' +10 (observed range: -10 to +10). The means fO'r these index values, classified by subjects' initial and assigned positions, are given in Table 2 , tO'gether with final opinion data. Note.-Cell n's are given in parentheses in the upper part of the table. The potential range for the cognitive reaction index was -10 to +10 while that for the opinion meas ure was 0 to 20. In both cases, the higher end of the scale represents favorability to specialized Undergraduate education. The within-ooUs standard deviation estima.tes were 3.86 for the reaction jndex and 3.52 for the opinion measure.
ANT.HONY G. GBEENW ALD Analysis of variance of the data for judgments of the 10 statements ( reaction index) indicated significant main effects of initial position (F = 19.03, 1 and 46 df, p < .(01) and assigned position (F = 8.62, 1 and 46 df, p < .01) with no interaction (F < 1). The main eff~t of assigned position, as in the preliminary experiment, was in the direction predicted by the cognitive response analysis. In light of the modifications of the statement judgment task employed in the present experiment, a conclusion in favor of the cognitive response interpretation of role playing can now be made with increased confidence. The fact that the effect was statistically weaker than in the preliminary experiment reinforces the author's suspicions concerning the possible contribution of demand char acteristics to the earlier finding.
Also in confirmation of results obtained in the preliminary experiment, it was found that both initial position and assigned position had signifi cant main effects on subjects' final opinions (F = 25.33, 1 and 46 df, " < .001, and F 5.28,1 and 46 df, p < .05, respectively), with no Significant interaction. The latter main effect, indicating again that the "role-playing effect" occurred without actual role playing, will be considered further below.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
UnbiMed Cognitive Responding in Role Playing
In the author's previous research (Cullen and Greenwald, 1967; Green wald, 1968) , in the literature on social judgment (e.g., Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 1957) , and for subjects expecting to defend their initial posi tions in the present research, it has generally been found that initial opinion accounts for substantial variance in evaluative cognitive responses to controversial information. The data from the present experiments indicated, however, that for subjects expecting to advocate a position opposing their own, initial opinion accounted for little or no variance in such responses. That is, subjects expecting to play counterattitudinal roles did not systematically favor either their initial or their assigned position in judging controversial information. As Table 1 shows for the preliminary experiment, when expecting to defend their initial positions, subjects with opposing initial positions were very far apart in their evaluations of the controversial statements (difference between mean index scores -:-12.22, F 413.16, 1 and 62 df, " < .001); on the other hand, the difference in evaluations of the statements for subjects with opposing initial positions who expected to advocate the position opposing their own fell short of statistical significance (difference between means 3.39, F = 3.72, p > .05). A similar pattern was observed for the validity judgment task in ROLE PLAYING AND OPINION CHANGE 38S the main experiment (see Table 2 ), with significant separation as a function of initial position for subjects expecting to defend their positions (Xdlf! 7.95, F = 28.30, 1 and 46 df, p < .001), but not for subjects expecting to advocate positions opposing their own (Xdlff 1.70, F 1.17, us). These results may alternately be expressed by noting that the mean reaction index differed significantly from zero in the direction of initial opinion for all four groups of opinion-defending role players (p < .005, two-tailed, in all cases), while this index mean did not differ signifi cantly from zero for any of the four groups of expectant counterattitudi· nal role players (p > .15, two-tailed, in all cases).
In summary, subjects expecting to play an opinion-defending role tended strongly to accept statements supporting their own position and to reject opposing ones, while those expecting to playa counterattitudinal role accepted approximately equal numbers of statements favoring both positions. These findings support the conclusion that counterattitudinal role-playing assignments induce a disposition toward unbiased evaluation of controversial information, in sharp contrast with the biased (opinion consistent) disposition of subjects who expected to advocate their own opinions.
Comparison with control data. In order to confirm that the observed unbiasedness of expectant counterattitudinal role players represented a deviation from normal tendencies toward biased evaluation of contro versial information, 48 additional subjects were run as a control group after completion of the main experiment. These control subjects were exposed to a procedure identical to that used in the main experiment with the exception that there was no expectation of subsequent role playing. That is, the control subjects simply expressed their initially preferred positions and then gave validity judgments for the set of 10 statements on the general-specialized education issue. It was expected that control subgroups with opposing initial opinions would manifest a greater dif ference in mean reaction indexes than did opposing-initial-opinion sub groups of expectant counterattitudinal role players in the main experi ment. This was indeed found to be the case. The mean reaction index was + 2.00 for control subjects with initial preference for specialized educa tion (N = 25) and -3.44 for those initially preferring general education (N = 23). The difference between these means (Xdlff =5.44) was signi ficantly greater than the corresponding mean difference (X difr = 1.70) for expectant counterattitudinal role players in the main experiment (t = L89, 92 df, p = .03, I-tailed), and was near-significantly smaller than that (X diff = 7.95) for expectant opinion-defending role players in the main experiment (t = 1.34, 92 df, p .09, I-tailed). These data demon strate that the unbiased judgments of expectant counterattitudinal rol.El 384 ANTHONY G. GREENWAIJ) players represent a deviation from a normal tendency to give opinion consistent judgments (both the control subgroup means were significantly different from zero at p < .01, I-tailed). The suggestion of a bias increasing effect of opinion-defending assignments is interesting in its own right, but the present data cannot be regarded as conclusive in demon strating that effect.
Effects of the Role-Playing Assignment on Opinions
In both the preliminary and main experiments, reliable effects of the role-playing assignments on opinion were manifest, even though there was no actual performance of the assigned role. In order to determine whether these effects occurred primarily for expectant counterattitudinal role players rather than for expectant opinion-defending role players, comparisons were made with opinion data collected from the same sub jects who provided control data for the reaction index findings. Control subjects who initially favored general education had a mean opinion score of 7.57, in contrast with a mean of 13.32 for those who initially favored specialized education. The difference between these means (Xdif! = 5.76) was near-significantly greater than the corresponding mean difference (Xdiff = 3.05) for expectant counterattitudinal role players in the main experiment (t 1.52, 92 dt, p = .07, I-tailed), and was smaller than that (Xdifr 7.22) for expectant opinion-defending role players in the main experiment, but not significantly so (t < 1). These findings suggest that the observed opinion effects in the main experiment reflected pre dominantly a shift toward the opposing point of view by expectant counterattitudinal role players. However, similar comparisons with opinion data for the preliminary experiment would suggest, in contrast, that the chief basis for the opinion effect in that experiment was polarization of the opinions of expectant opinion-defenders. Very likely, the effects of the role-playing assignments on opinion were distributed among both cate gories of expectant role players.
Three possible sourees of these opinion effects were (a) the simple administration and aceeptance of the role-playing assignments, (b) opportunity for covert role playing prior to the final opinion measure, or ( c) the impact of the controversial information as evaluated under the in fluence of judgmental sets induced by the role-playing assignments. The design of the main experiment did not provide any basis for selecting among these alternative interpretations.
An additional uncertainty regarding interpretation of the present data concerns the conceptual relation between the tasks of giving validity judgments for the set of controversial statements and giving agreement judgments for the Likert-type opinion items. One possibility is to consider BOLE PLAYING AND OPINION CHANGE these tasks conceptually the samc--either as two varieties of oplwon measurement items or as two fonnats for measuring cognitive response dispositions regarding controversial infonnation. Supporting either of these interpretations is the fact that positive correlations were obtained between the two measures. In the main experiment, for subjects expecting to advocate specialized education the product-moment correlation be~ tween the two measures was .49 (p < .01, I-tailed); for those expecting to advocate general education the correlation was .31 (p < .07, I-tailed).
At the same time, these correlations were sufficiently low to allow for the possibility that the two measures tap processes that are mutually quite distinct. Also supporting a conceptual distinction between the two meas ures is the difference between their patterns of means as shown in Tables  1 and 2 ; this difference can be summarized by noting that the reaction index for the validity judgment task was somewhat less sensitive to dif ferences in initial opinion and somewhat more sensitive to the manipula tion of assigned position than was the opinion measure. This last observa tion raises the interesting possibility that the cognitive reaction measure may be more sensitive than standard opinion measures for detecting effects of manipulated pcrsuasion-relevant variables.
Theoretical Interpretation
Of the five interpretations of role-playing effectiveness listed at the beginning of this paper, three-selective learning, self as source, and hand-tailoring-must be regarded as inapplicable to the present data because of the absence of actual role playing from the experimental procedures. It should not be concluded that these three interpretations are therefore incorrect; they may well account for some aspect of the effec tiveness of actual role playing in inducing opinion change.
Dissonance. The dissonance interpretation proposes a motivational basis for cognitive effects of the role-playing procedure. Specifically, the counterattitudinal role player is assumed to credit increased validity to the role-played position in order to reduce dissonance aroused by advo cating a disbelieved viewpoint (Festinger, 1957) and perhaps exacerbated by concomitant expenditure of effort (Zimbardo, 1965) . It seems unlikely, however, that the present procedures satisfied the conditions (Brehm and Cohen, 1962) necessary to arouse dissonance: Subjects were allowed no choice in beiDg asked to role play; it is therefore unlikely that they could have felt voluntarily committed to counterattitudinal advocacy; further, they had not yet played the counterattitudinal role nor engaged in role associated effort at the time when the cognitive dependent measures were administered. Nonetheless, of course, dissonance in some anticipatory fonn could conceivably have been aroused. Fortunately, a judgment on the applicability of the dissonance interpretation is quite tangential to the basic conclusion of the present study. The dissonance interpretation is con cerned with why there are cognitive effects of counterattitudinal role playing. The present cognitive response analysis is basically concerned with how opinion change is produced by role playing. The suggested answer to this how question-that opinion change follows from the adop tion of an unbiased evaluative disposition for attitude-relevant infor mation-does not require commitment to any specific interpretation of the motivational correlates of the changed cognitive disposition.
Biased scanning. A recent statement of the biased scanning hypothesis has been given by Elms and Janis (1965): According to "incentive theory," the attitude changes produced by role playing are mediated by intensive "biased scanning" of positive incentives, which involves two types of verbal responses: (1) fulfilling the demands of the role-playing task by recalling and inventing argu ments that are capable of functioning as positive incentives for accept ing a new attitude position, and (2) appraising the recalled and improvised arguments with a psychological set that fosters open minded cognitive exploration of their potential incentive value, rather than a negativistic set of the type engendered by the arousal of feelings of hostility, resentment, or suspicion. (Elms and Janis, 1965, p. 59, italics in original.) This statement appeals to several processes. The selective recall and invention (hand-tailoring) processes seem inapplicable to the present data for reasons already noted. However, the appeal to an open-minded cognitive set fits very well with the present data. In fact, the present study has confirmed the italicized clause in the Elms-Janis statement of "incen tive theory" more directly than have any previous analyses of counter attitudinal role-playing performances. Previous findings have been limited to observation of quality variations in essays written under different incentive conditions (e.g., Janis and Gilmore, 1965; Rosenberg, 1965) . Such observations do not necessarily indicate that counterattitudinal role players adopt an open-minded cognitive set and, in fact, have not always demonstrated even that larger incentives for counterattitudinal role pLj.ying yield superior role performance (c.g., Elms and J allis, 1965) .
\Vhile incentives that may operate in persuasion situations have been defined in terms of "supporting reasons" (for opinion change) and "antic ipated rewards and punishments" (Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953, p. 11) , exactly what these incentives may be for the counterattitudinal role player has not been explicitly specified by incentive-theory analysts (e.g., Elms and Janis, 1965; Janis and Gilmore, 1965) . It is in response to this problem that motivational analyses such as those based on cogni tive dissonance, need for achievement, desire to please the experimenter, etc., may be of some use. As already noted, the present findings cannot be interpreted as implicating any specific source of motivation for the counterattitudinal role player's open-mindedness.
As a final comment on the incentive analysis, it may be suggested that the phrase "biased scanning" is inappropriate for designating the effects of the counterattitudinal role-playing assignment on cognitive information processing. The counterattitudinal role player appears, as has indeed been suggested by Elms and Janis (1965) , to be unbiased and open minded in his evaluation of controversial information, whUe it is the op,inion-defending role player who is cognitively biased in the sense of rejecting good arguments favoring the opposing view and accepting weak ones faVOring his own position.
Conclusion
The problems of interpreting the nature and basis of obtained opinion effects, the conceptual relation between the validity judgment and opinion measures, and the motivational determinants of cognitive processes in the role-playing situation must await further experimentation. However, these problems of interpretation are tangential to the basic conclusions of the present study-which are that judgmental (or cognitive response) dispo sitions regarding controversial information are reliably influenced by expected role-playing assignments and, more particularly, that subjects expecting to advocate a position opposing their own evaluate controversial information in a manner reflecting no initial position bias.
In summary, counterattitudinal role playing may be uniquely effective because it succeeds in getting the subject to give impartial evaluation to information opposing his own opinion-something he would do rarely, if at all, under other circumstances. Lest the reader be left with the feeling that role playing is an unfailing technique for persuasion, it must be noted that role playing does not always work (d. McGuire, 1966, p. 49B ). An obvious limitation on the applicability of role playing as a persuasion technique is that there must be a situation in which the target of persua sion can be prevailed upon to play the counterattitudinal role. More directly pertinent to the present finding is the possibility that the role players impartial judgment disposition may be applicable only to new information-that is, information for which the role player has not already learned negative cognitive responses. Given this possible limitation, it may be that the role player's impartiality will be of no avail on highly familiar issues or on issues for which there is Uttle acc~ss tl;» n~ information,
